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Claudia Ruitenberg’s recent work on democratic education has 
spurred an important debate.1 On the one hand, philosophers of  educa-
tion such as Amy Guttman and Dennis Thompson, and more recently 
Tomas Englund, draw from John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas to claim 
that democratic education should be rooted in deliberative competence, 
consensus practices, and reasonability. Call them the deliberators. Draw-
ing from critiques of  this deliberative tradition made by Chantal Mouffe, 
Ruitenberg calls for a democratic education of  adversaries, a pluralistic 
agonism in education rather than a deliberative reasonability that, ac-
cording to Mouffe, represses the confrontational forces constitutive of  
democracy. This educational agonism prioritizes passion, affect, and 
imagination - all oriented towards disagreement rather than consensus. 
Others, such as Gert Biesta, have developed this agonist position further. 
Call them the agonists. 
While Ruitenberg gestures towards the praxis of  agonistic 
democratic education using examples of  social movements and current 
events, neither she nor others working in her paradigm have extended 
her thinking to educational discussion. This essay will bring the tradition 
of  democratic discussion to bear on the debate between the deliberators 
and agonists, and recommend discussion techniques consistent with the 
agonist position. These recommendations serve two purposes. First, they 
respond to one of  the deliberators’ dismissals of  agonism, namely that 
struggle and conflict are inherent to the deliberative process. Second, the 
recommendations sharpen the practical differences between a deliberative 
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and an agonistic democratic education viz. discussion in movements and 
classrooms.
 
DELIBERATORS, AGONISTS, AND DISCUSSION
Martin Samuelsson has done important work in synthesizing the 
deliberators’ position. Citing Zsuzsanna Chappell, Dennis Thompson, 
David Held, and Simone Chambers, he writes: 
Theories of  deliberative democracy hold that the es-
sence of  democratic politics does not lie in voting and 
representation but in the common deliberation that 
underlies collective decision making ... At the core of  
these theories is the reason-giving requirement: Citizens 
and their representatives should justify to each other in 
a process of  public deliberation the laws they impose 
on one another ... In short, a legitimate political order is 
one that can be justified to all those living under its law.2
Law and procedural communication, in the form reason-giving talk, are 
paramount in deliberative democracy. This focus on procedure carries 
over into deliberative democratic education. Citing Tomas Englund, 
Samuelsson summarizes:
A deliberative educative situation ... is one in which  (a) 
different views are confronted with one another and 
arguments for them are articulated; (b) there is tolerance 
and respect for the concrete other, and participants listen 
to each other’s arguments; and (c) there are elements of  
collective-will formation, a desire to reach consensus or 
a temporary agreement.3 
A democratic education distilled from the theory of  deliberative democracy 
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emphasizes argumentation, a kind of  civil-civic listening, and consensus. 
Preparing to vote is the paradigm activity for this democratic education: 
deliberative democratic education, Samuelsson writes, “emphasises the 
communicative formation of  will and opinion that precedes voting.”4 
Ruitenberg’s agonistic democratic education is in stark contrast. 
Whereas politics for the deliberators is equivalent to lawful and reason-
able procedure, “the political” for Chantal Mouffe, writes Ruitenberg, 
is the realm of  activity that lawful and reasonable procedure seeks to 
limit: “Instead of  claiming that deliberative models are not working well 
enough to contain such conflict,” says Ruitenberg, “Mouffe would argue 
that deliberative models have worked too well, eliminating important 
possibilities for agonistic, political conflict.”5 
Politics, for Mouffe, is “the ensemble of  practices, dis-
courses and institutions which seek to establish a certain 
order and organize human coexistence in conditions that 
are always potentially conflictual because they are affected 
by the dimension of  ‘the political’.” This dimension of  
“the political” is the opposition or, in Mouffe’s words, 
“antagonism that is inherent in human relations” and 
“constitutive of  human societies.”6
The democratic education flowing downstream from this notion of  the 
political looks quite different from the deliberators’ democratic education. 
Agonistic democratic education educates for political emotions, fosters 
and encourages political dispute among conflicting identities, and un-
derstands left-right ideological tensions as irresolvable. Deliberators are 
centrists who value rational resolution, aiming at consensus. They work 
for an end to partisan polarization, treating contingency as contingent 
to the effectiveness of  democratic institutions. Agonists view politics 
as struggle all the way down, prioritizing partisanship in the spirit of  
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protest, embracing contingency. For agonists, institutions should move 
in rhythm with struggle and difference, rather than against struggle and 
difference. Mouffe uses the notion of  we/they to illustrate the difference: 
deliberators seek to eliminate a sense of  we/they divisions in democrat-
ic politics, using institutions to dissolve it; while agonists embrace the 
sense of  we/they divisions, and orient democratic institutions towards 
preventing the we/they from becoming destructive. In a word, agonists 
understand democracy with a spirit of  protest, deliberators understand 
it with a spirit of  procedure.
Deliberators argue that this split relies on a distinction without a 
difference (more on this later). The proof  should be in the pedagogical 
pudding. I will focus on educational discussion as a test case. Participants 
speaking and listening in turns about shared questions is a frequent feature 
of  classrooms and movements. Furthermore, there is a long research 
tradition arguing that discussion and democracy go hand in hand. David 
Bridges was the first to trace the democratic heritage of  group talk that 
addresses questions in common, tracking the lineage of  discussion and 
democracy from Pericles to John Milton to John Stuart Mill. Nicholas 
Burbules, building on Bridges’ work in the adjacent field of  dialogue 
studies, notes that discussion is the practice of  democracy.7 Diana Hess 
argues that prohibiting discussion is akin to prohibiting democracy 
itself, and Walter Parker has claimed that discussion is a first form of  
democratic socialization.8 Sophie Haroutunian-Gordon elaborates how 
interpretive discussion can develop the democratic values of  tolerance 
and openness.9 Further, in their recent work, Hess and Paula McAvoy 
advocate controversial issue discussions as a key form of  political edu-
cation for democracy.10 
The discussive democracy tradition rarely converges with the 
debate between the deliberators and agonists. When it does, democratic 
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discussion is theorized exclusively as deliberation. Samuelsson provides 
a typology of  deliberative classroom discussion, for example, extending 
the deliberators’ arguments to generate three features of  a deliberative 
discussion: reason-giving, willingness to listen, and reaching consensus. 
Similarly, Hess and McAvoy in their recent work look at deliberative dis-
cussion techniques used in United States high schools, focusing on how 
students talk about positions on controversial political issues, such as 
abortion, through mock policy debates and activities mirroring the legis-
lative process. Hess and McAvoy cite Thompson and Guttman explicitly. 
We have to imagine the agonists would disagree with this pedagogy, and 
that their discussion pedagogy would be substantively different than the 
deliberators’. Yet this has not necessarily been the case in the agonist 
literature. 
THE AGONISTS’ DISCUSSION PROBLEM
Ruitenberg gestures towards agonistic discussion in “Conflict, 
Affect, and the Political: On Disagreement as Democratic Capacity.” 
Following Simon Critchley, Ruitenberg calls for an “inductive political 
education” where “we respond ... to concrete situations in which we 
perceive an injustice, such as a labour strike, an act of  police brutality, or 
the discriminatory treatment of  migrant workers.”11 Drawing from Yannis 
Stavrakakis, Ruitenberg stipulates that this inductive education should 
engage with social imaginaries and contested identities. Ruitenberg then 
gives an example of  what this inductive education of  social imaginary 
might look like in a discussion:
... it was a tragedy that, in December 2008, a 47-year-
old woman burnt to death when she lit candles in her 
makeshift shelter under a shopping cart on Davie Street 
in Vancouver, Canada. It was also a stark reminder of  the 
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injustice faced by homeless people whose only choice 
seems to be the cold street ...To take this tragic event 
as the point of  departure for a discussion of  social 
imaginaries would involve a discussion of  broad political 
values and commitments - to individual liberty, social 
equality, and individual and collective responsibilities 
for mental health care and housing. Different from ap-
proaches that might focus on the procedural or policy 
aspects, the emotional responses to this event would be 
an explicit part of  this discussion.12 
An inductive political education that engages social imaginaries 
and responds to concrete situations of  perceived injustice would look 
like a discussion about poverty. This discussion would include broad po-
litical values and emotional responses to the event as “an explicit part.” 
Ruitenberg notes that “these emotional responses are what make some 
educators nervous to discuss ‘charged’ events such as the one I described 
above.”13 An agonistic discussion takes up charged events, which might 
make some educators nervous, bringing controversy and passion into 
the classroom discussion. 
Ruitenberg is not at odds with the discussive tradition in recom-
mending such a discussion, nor is she at odds with the deliberative tradition. 
Controversy is uncontroversial in these literatures. Hess advocates facil-
itating controversial issue discussions about emotionally-charged topics, 
Haroutunian-Gordon incorporates the back-and-forth interpretability 
of  textual meaning as central to her pedagogy, and Bridges called for 
disagreement during educational discussion, a point he takes from John 
Stuart Mill. Disagreement and conflicting points of  view are expected 
in the discussive democracy literature and in deliberative democratic 
education. Ruitenberg’s agonistic discussion thus appears equivalent to 
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discussions recommended by deliberators whose philosophy of  democracy 
is contrary to hers. Deliberators have pointed out this equivalence when 
responding to Ruitenberg’s agonistic critique. Englund, for instance, de-
fends the deliberators by writing that disagreement is a built-in feature of  
deliberation: deliberators seeking consensus come from different points 
of  view, and so there must be struggle and controversy when expressing 
those views during deliberation.14 Claiming the Mouffian point against 
the deliberative tradition draws a distinction without a difference, En-
glund calls out Ruitenberg’s critique of  democratic education as unjust 
and misplaced. The discussive tradition somewhat confirms Englund’s 
point here. Though that literature may not draw from the affective and 
adversarial epistemology set out by Chantal Mouffe, agonism is sec-
ond-nature to those thinking about discussion as democratic education. 
When the philosophical rubber meets the pedagogical road in a formal 
discussion (be it in a classroom, office, or movement space), there is 
little disagreement about the need for disagreement over charged topics. 
Agreeing to disagree during discussion problematically aligns agonists 
with the deliberators. I call this a discussion problem for the agonist’s 
democratic education.
Looking at this problem more closely, there is not an exact equiv-
alence between agonists and deliberators when it comes to pedagogical 
recommendations. First, their chosen philosophers and intellectual dis-
courses are distinct (e.g., Mouffe versus Rawls); second, Ruitenberg and 
Mouffe explicitly state that emotion and passion and conflict constitute 
democracy itself, whereas Englund, for instance, argues that passions are 
extraneous and disruptive. These are significant differences and points 
of  contention. Yet the agonists still face a discussion problem when it 
comes to praxis. While the deliberators’ and agonists’ philosophies are 
different, and while the content of  their discussions may differ themat-
ically, their discussion praxes end up looking the same in the literature: 
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they agree that disagreeing is a good thing during discussion. One could 
imagine Englund endorsing Ruitenberg’s suggested discussion about 
poverty in Vancouver, for example, and bringing in divergent positions 
to that discussion. 
How can agonists maintain our critique of  deliberative democratic 
education if  our pedagogical recommendations for discussion end up 
looking more or less the same as the deliberators’? What does agonism 
look like during discussion, if  we do not want to slip into deliberation?
RADICAL DISCUSSIONS
Ruitenberg and Englund’s disagreements give clues. Ruitenberg 
writes that “emotional responses” should be an “explicit part” of  the 
discussion, and that young people “should be given opportunities to 
experience this kind of  disagreement and the affective commitments 
that drive it.”15 Deliberators on the other hand feel uncomfortable with 
emotion during discussion. Englund claims that teachers should “hesitate 
in promoting” passionate positions, and that they should stick to what 
is “suitable” during classroom discussion.16 For an agonistic discussion 
true to Ruitenberg’s call, one that applies her thinking to the discussive 
democratic tradition, teachers should promote passionate talk about 
issues in ways that transgress the boundaries of  suitability, rather than 
focusing on dispassionate utterances within the constraints of  suitable 
contents or forms of  speech. In the remainder of  the essay I use these 
differences to operationalize protocols for discussions - what I call rad-
ical discussions - that fit the agonistic model of  democratic education 
Ruitenberg has staked out. 
There are two aspects to consider for any discussion protocol, 
radical or otherwise: form and content of  speech. Form is how people 
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speak and listen, in what sequence, and the types of  things they say (ques-
tions, arguments, debates, digressions); whereas content is the particular 
words, texts, questions, and issues they talk about. One can give a lecture 
on non-hierarchical pedagogy for instance, and the form and content of  
this pedagogy are at odds. Alternatively, the way a group speaks and listens 
can vary in important ways as the content of  their discussions stays the 
same: a recitation about the Movement for Black Lives is different than 
a conversation or debate or interrogation of  that movement. Radical 
discussions, to be distinct from deliberative discussions, should be distinct 
in both their form and content.
In a forthcoming response to Samuelsson’s 2016 essay, I critique 
deliberative discussion from the Ruitenbergian position, first by citing 
the importance of  an equal and various sequence of  turns.17 In an equal 
and various sequence, no single person repeatedly follows up comments, 
and each participant has equal opportunity to have the floor. Socratic 
dialogues tend not to have an equal and various sequence of  moves, 
for instance: Socrates follows up most comments, insisting on being 
the questioner. I have also argued elsewhere that when a single voice 
dominates discussion, one voice remains the sole focus of  attention, 
or when a facilitator refuses to permit other patterns or scripts during 
interaction, a monarchy forms in the discussive order. This monarchy 
makes masses out of  participants rather than creating groups with them.18 
Given that the agonist perspective calls for multiple and plural collective 
identities, an agonistic facilitator would want to make sure that multiple 
people address each other in a mix of  ways, rather than letting the same 
participants constantly address and be addressed by others. A deliberative 
facilitator would most likely want everyone to speak at appropriate times 
in specifically suitable ways, even when permitting student-to-student 
talking. While it is a small thing to permit participants to speak amongst 
themselves in a mix of  moves, doing so can make a big difference in the 
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rhythm, feeling, and outcome of  the discussion. I contend that those 
qualities align with Ruitenberg’s agonism: discussions permitting a mix 
of  moves and a diverse distribution of  authority are radical discussions. 
Two pedagogies work towards this mixture of  moves during discussion: 
Harkness teaching, a form of  student-centered discussion found mostly 
in elite private schools in the United States; and horizontal pedagogy, a set 
of  techniques that emerged during the Occupy Wall Street movement in 
the New York City and were influenced by psychoanalysis and the work 
of  Brazilian philosopher Walter O. Kohan.19 
Continuing with discussive form, Ariel Sarid’s distinction between 
deliberative and deconstructive dialogue is helpful for parsing the features 
of  agonistic discussion from deliberative discussion. (The term dialogue 
here is not meant as a term of  art. While it sometimes signals a related 
research tradition - from Socrates to Martin Buber, Paulo Freire, Mikhail 
Bahktin, Jonathan Lear, and the Philosophy for Children paradigm - I 
intend the word here as a synonym for discussion.) For Sarid, deconstruc-
tive dialogue takes its cue from Jacques Derrida, whereas communicative 
discourse (the deliberative correlate) follows Jürgen Habermas. While 
similar to, though importantly distinct figure from, Chantal Mouffe, 
Ruitenberg has worked extensively with Derrida and the deconstructive 
tradition, as has Mouffe. I argue the qualities of  deconstructive discussion 
Sarid elaborates fit well with agonistic democratic education. 
Whereas autonomy is the deliberative tradition’s basic value, a 
deconstructive discussion, for Sarid, prioritizes difference and a plurality 
of  voices, a “responsibility for preserving the otherness of  the Other.”20 
The favored personality attributes, or the personal qualities, that decon-
structive discussion most encourages, are creativity and openness, such 
that there is a tendency to avoid structured or commonly-held perceptions, 
a tendency to accept unusual ideas, and an inclination towards flexibility 
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and experimentation. This creative openness stands in contrast to the 
deliberative attribute of  agreeableness. The pedagogical orientation of  
the facilitator in a deconstructive discussion is permissive, meaning that 
the facilitator places authority on the otherness of  the other, though they 
will not be permissive with respect to domination, confronting ethical 
and practical dilemmas stemming from tensions created by the goal of  
lessening their authority as facilitator. Rather than the deliberative tradi-
tion’s emphasis on communicative rationality, the dialogical process of  
a deconstructive discussion is an open-ended one, seeking to promote 
changes in comprehension or attitude toward a given concept or opinion, 
as well as achieving during the discussion a sense of  justice grounded on 
the principles of  friendliness, openness, and responsibility to the “Other.” 
Similarly, whereas the end-result of  deliberation is consensus, the end-result 
of  a deconstructive dialogue is divergent change in meanings. Finally, most 
appropriately aligned with Ruitenberg’s political education, the political 
orientation and organizational structure of  a deconstructive discussion is 
not deliberative democracy but rather a radical democracy yet-to-come: 
the sustenance of  irreducible singularity, inclusion of  difference, and the 
ongoing dissolution of  permanent hierarchy and authority.21
What should a radical discussion with these qualities look, sound, 
and feel like? A mix of  moves, as described above, is an important suggestion 
for the form of  such a radical discussion. But there is also the question 
of  content. The Black Marxist feminist bell hooks is a key resource, as 
she includes activities and provocations for classroom discussion in her 
work. In Teaching Community, hooks writes a chapter on “Talking Race and 
Racism,” making reference to teachers’ “reluctance” to confront white 
supremacy, particularly when students openly claim that race is no longer 
an issue in the United States. She describes an activity she does in class 
that readies the ground for meaningful discussions about race:
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In classroom settings I have often listened to groups of  
students tell me that racism really no longer shapes the 
contours of  our lives, that there is just no such thing as 
racial difference, that “we are all just people.” Then a 
few minutes later I give them an exercise. I ask if  they 
were about to die and could choose to come back as 
a white male, a white female, a black female, or black 
male, which identity would they choose. Each time I do 
this exercise, most individuals, irrespective of  gender or 
race invariably choose whiteness, and most often white 
maleness. Black females are the least chosen. When I 
ask students to explain their choice they proceed to 
do a sophisticated analysis of  privilege based on race 
(with perspectives that take gender and class into con-
sideration). This disconnect between their conscious 
repudiation of  race as a marker of  privilege and their 
unconscious understanding is a gap we have to bridge, 
an illusion that must be shattered before a meaningful 
discussion of  race and racism can take place.22 
This which-identity-would-you-choose exercise readies the 
ground for “meaningful discussion of  race and racism,”23 since it takes 
a consensus about the non-existence of  racial inequality and unearths an 
unconscious awareness about its existence. The exercise asks students 
to engage racism structurally through their identities and unconscious 
preferences. hooks writes the word “meaningful” to describe the kind 
of  discussion for which this activity prepares participants, but “radical” 
also fits, given its usage in this essay. hooks goes on to mention another 
important content-related point for radical discussions. On the subject of  
challenging racist speech in formal settings, she observes that sometimes 
when a person of  color challenges a white person’s racist speech, the 
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group will treat the utterer of  racist remarks as a victim and the person 
of  color as a perpetrator. She goes on to speculate that:
People often tell me that they do not share openly and 
candidly their thoughts about white-supremacist thought 
and racism for fear that they will say the wrong thing. And 
yet when this reason is interrogated it usually is shown 
to cover up the fear of  conflict, the belief  that saying 
the wrong thing will generate conflict, bad feeling, or 
lead to counterattack. Groups where white folks are in 
the majority often insist that race and racism does not 
really have much meaning in today’s world because we 
are all so beyond caring about it. I ask them why they 
then have so much fear about speaking their minds. 
Their fear, their censoring silence, is indicative of  the 
loaded meaning race and racism have in our society.24
This passage brings up several important pieces of  content that 
radical discussions would include. The first is explicitly challenging racist 
speech. When a participant says something that is perceived to be, or 
actually is, racist, whether a microaggression or an overtly aggressive 
comment, it is important to stop the class and deal with that comment 
head on, perhaps even making it the topic of  the discussion in place 
of  the planned topic or activity (a facilitation rule might be to ask hurt 
participants to say “ouch,” to which the speaker can say “oops,” and a 
conversation ensues). The second important content-related concern in 
this passage is working through the fear of  speaking one’s mind about 
issues such as racism, and talking about it despite its apparent unsuitability. 
Radical discussions promote talk about how participants ourselves are 
subject to capitalist exploitation, gender oppression, colonialism, ableism, 
and so on, rather than repress the subject of  our own subjection in the 
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name of  suitable speech.
Race is only one social category that influences social experience, 
however, and the intersectionality paradigm led by Kimberlé Crenshaw is 
an important framework to use when selecting contents for radical dis-
cussion. Intersectionality research provides excellent content for radical 
discussions, exposing the way social categories such as race, gender, and 
class interlock and commingle in social practices. As an example, one 
could create a syllabus using intersectional research on educational prac-
tices of  interest to teachers. Intersectional research on school shootings, 
bullying, cyberbullying, Black parents’ school strategies for their children, 
solidarity programs for Latina middle schoolers, zero tolerance policies, 
inclusive education, and physical education, can show the agonistic plu-
ralism inherent in those educational practices.25 
 There are many resources available for form and content in 
radical discussions, too many to fully elaborate here. The website Teaching 
for Change recently posted a collection of  resources for teaching about 
Black Lives Matter.26 The listening working group led by Leonard Waks 
writes about important practices and theories of  listening, and specifical-
ly noteworthy are Ashley Taylor’s work on Megan Boler’s pedagogy of  
discomfort and Suzanne Rice’s work on Freirian listening.27 The edited 
volume Critical Pedagogy in the 21st Century is a treasure trove of  provocative 
materials that teachers and students of  agonistic democracy can use in 
classrooms and movement spaces.28
CONCLUSION
A burden of  proof  now falls on the deliberators. They must 
show that agonists recommending the radical discussions elaborated here 
still rely on a distinction without a difference when distinguishing their 
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model of  democratic education from that of  the deliberative tradition. 
If  agonists rely on a distinction without a difference, then deliberators 
should welcome radical discussions that permit cross talk between par-
ticipants in a mix of  moves; deconstructive discussions that emphasize 
difference, otherness, and struggle with authority in the spirit of  protest; 
discussions that unsettle participants’ social imaginaries, confront micro 
and macro aggressive speech, and break through illusions about racism, 
sexism, and classism intersectionally. In my estimation, deliberators do not 
welcome such discussions, but I look forward to discussing the matter: 
President Donald Trump’s election in the United States, amidst a global 
trend toward conservative, populist, and repressive nationalisms, calls for 
serious reflection on how we educate for democracy today.
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